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BTG-AC: Break-the-Glass Access Control Model
for Medical Data in Wireless Sensor Networks
Htoo Aung Maw, Hannan Xiao, Bruce Christianson, and James A. Malcolm
Abstract—Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have recently at-
tracted much interest in the research community because of their
wide range of applications. An emerging application for WSNs
involves their use in healthcare where they are generally termed
wireless medical sensor networks. In a hospital, outfitting every
patient with tiny, wearable, wireless vital sign sensors would allow
doctors, nurses, and other caregivers to continuously monitor the
state of their patients. In such a scenario, patients are expected to
be treated in reasonable time, so an access control model is needed,
which will provide both real-time access to comprehensive med-
ical records and detect unauthorized access to sensitive data. In
emergency situations, a doctor or nurse needs to access data im-
mediately. The loss in data availability can result in further decline
in the patient’s condition or can even lead to death. Therefore, the
availability of data is more important than any security concern
in emergency situations. To address that research issue for med-
ical data in WSNs, we propose the break-the-glass access control
(BTG-AC) model that is a modified and redesigned version of the
break-the-glass role-based access control (BTG-RBAC) model to
address data availability issue and to detect the security policy
violations from both authorized and unauthorized users. Several
changes within the access control engine are made in BTG-RBAC
in order to make the new BTG-AC to apply and fit in WSNs. This
paper presents the detailed design and development of the BTG-AC
model based on a healthcare scenario. The evaluation results show
that the concepts of BTG, prevention and detection mechanism,
and obligation provide more flexible access than other current ac-
cess control models in WSNs. Additionally, we compare the BTG-
AC model with an adaptive access control (A2 C) model, which
has similar properties, for further evaluation. Alongside with the
comparison, the advantages and disadvantages of BTG-AC over
current WSN access control models are presented.
Index Terms—Access control, authorization, availability, body
sensor networks, privacy, security, wireless sensor networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
W IRELESS sensor networks (WSNs) have attracted muchinterest in the research community because of their wide
range of applications. An emerging application for WSNs in-
volves their use in healthcare where they are generally termed as
wireless medical sensor networks (WMSNs). In a hospital, out-
fitting patients with tiny, wearable, wireless vital sign sensors
would allow doctors, nurses, and other caregivers to monitor
continuously the state of their patients. More importantly, in an
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emergency scenario, the same technology would enable medics
to care more effectively for large numbers of casualties.
There are numerous applications like medical, battlefield, and
environment monitoring in WSNs and security issue is impor-
tant for many of them. Li and Gong [1] pointed out that WSNs
suffer from many constraints like limited energy supply, limited
memory, and low computation capability that impose unique
security challenges and make innovative approaches desirable.
Security techniques in other wireless technologies cannot be ap-
plied directly in WSNs because of its unique characteristic. As a
result, existing security mechanisms are inadequate, inefficient,
and new security approaches are desirable for WSNs.
In the healthcare industry, patients are expected to be treated
in reasonable time. Therefore, an access control model should
provide real-time access to comprehensive medical records. In
emergency situations, a doctor or nurse needs to access data
immediately. Any loss in data availability can result in further
decline in the patient’s condition or can even lead to death.
Therefore, the availability of data is more important than secu-
rity concerns. The overwhelming urgency is to take care of the
patient; however, the privacy and confidentiality of that patient’s
medical records cannot be neglected. Thus, careful considera-
tion in defining flexible policy is required to solve the conflict
between data privacy and data availability in this real-world ap-
plication. Additionally, it should also detect unauthorized infor-
mation release of patient medical records from both authorized
and unauthorized users because security breaches can happen at
any time.
Security policy violations in multiuser systems were catego-
rized by Anderson [2] into three categories: unauthorized in-
formation release, unauthorized information modification, and
unauthorized denial of use. It is difficult to address the above
violations in an access control policy for the healthcare appli-
cation because an overly “loose” policy might permit access to
inappropriate users, but an overly “tight” policy might prevent
access from the appropriate users. To solve the problem of defin-
ing a flexible policy, we need a flexible approach in the access
control engines to address all the possible access conditions.
The aim of this paper is to present new ways to provide a flex-
ible approach to access control engine in WSNs and WMSNs.
In addition, the other main issues we study concern the en-
forcement of access permissions dynamically across healthcare
organizations. They are:
1) Who is designated to get access in emergency situations?
2) What happens after a restricted access is granted or not
granted?
1A restricted access means a data access request to sensitive or confidential
data.
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Let us consider the following example from a healthcare ap-
plication to clarify the issues we aim to address in this paper.
Alice is a doctor who takes care of a patient named Bob. Alice
can access Bob’s medical record but when she is away from
work for some particular reason, such as sickness or on holiday,
who has the right to access Bob’s medical records in order to
evaluate and treat him appropriately? Data availability is impor-
tant: another doctor may need to access Bob’s medical records to
evaluate and treat his sickness. The healthcare system can pro-
vide data availability without security considerations but when
patients are celebrities or high-profile people, how can we con-
trol and manage the privacy of these patients? The assumption
is made that Bob is a celebrity who is in an emergency situation
and Alice is not available at that time. The problem is who else
has a designated access to Bob’s medical records to give an
effective treatment? Can other doctors or nurses from the emer-
gency ward access Bob’s medical record? If we consider the
sickness of the patient, data availability is needed to give timely
treatment, but what about the privacy of patient’s medical record
and information?
In the healthcare industry, the assumption cannot be made
that all the users are trustworthy enough to access data even in
emergency situations because security breaches can happen at
any time due to inappropriate usage. Additionally, a prevention
and detection mechanism is needed to detect security policy vi-
olations and to take courses of action for any access especially
when a restricted access is granted or not granted. The ques-
tion is: How can we design an access control model to provide
privacy, confidentiality and availability at the same time?
To address the above issue, the break-the-glass role-based
access control (BTG-RBAC) model [3], [4] proposed by Fer-
reira et al. is considered to apply in WSNs. The main reason
of choosing the BTG-RBAC over other access control models
is that it can address the conflict between data availability and
data privacy in WSNs. The BTG-RBAC model is implemented
in PREMIS [5] with MySQL [6] database, but it is not suitable
to use in WSNs because PREMIS must be supplemented by
metadata that can record detailed technical attributes of specific
object types or media and hardware, and it is difficult to au-
tomate creation of metadata structures at present. Therefore, a
modified version of BTG-RBAC is developed and implemented
in order to fit in WSNs namely a break-the-glass access control
(BTG-AC) model.
The main difference is that the BTG-AC model is devel-
oped and implemented within the Ponder2 policy package to
reduce memory and storage space by using the BTG policy for
emergency and unexpected situations instead of defining access
control policies for all situations in advance. Regarding limited
resource and storage, the sensor nodes cannot store all the possi-
bility of access control policies in practice. Therefore, the main
contribution of this paper is the design and development of a
lightweight BTG-AC model that considers the limited resource
and storage by applying BTG concept for unexpected and emer-
gency situations. In addition, the proposed model also addresses
the conflict between data privacy and data availability issue and
to detect the security policy violations from both authorized and
unauthorized users in healthcare application.
The remaining structure of this paper is explained as fol-
lows. Section II presents the related work. Section III discusses
an overview of the BTG-AC model for WSNs. The develop-
ment and implementation of the BTG-AC model in Ponder2
framework [7] can be seen in Section IV. Section V evaluates
BTG-AC based on a medical scenario. Section VI presents the
frameworks of the adaptive access control (A2C) model which
was proposed by Maw et al. [8] to make a comparison with
the proposed BTG-AC model in WSNs. Additionally, this sec-
tion reviews the advantages and disadvantages of BTG-AC over
current WSN access control models. Section VII concludes the
paper with the suggestion for future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Access control is a critical security service to prevent unau-
thorized access to network resources. In WSNs, users can enter a
sensor field directly to access data at the sensor nodes. Different
users may have different access privileges to access data at the
sensor nodes based on their roles. Maw et al. [9] stated that a con-
siderable number of access control models have been proposed
for use in WSNs, though some of them are not yet implemented.
The access control models such as trust and centrality-based ac-
cess control model [10], Maerien’s model [11], and Gaurkar’s
model [12] are aimed to prevent a malicious node from joining
the sensor network.
The distributed PRIvacy-preserving aCCESS control (PRIC-
CESS) protocol [13] is proposed to provide privacy preserving
distributed access control in WSNs. The PRICCESS model used
access control list (ACL) to store the access permission of user
groups in the network controller. For ACL, roles need to be
predefined in advance based on RBAC. Garcia-Morchon et al.
[14] pointed out that RBAC model is not good enough to use
in WSNs because in the traditional RBAC model, the roles and
policies have to be predefined in advance. Instead they pro-
posed the context-aware role-based access control (CA-RBAC)
model [15] for WMSNs, in which an access control decision will
be made based on the modular contextual information such as
normal, emergency and critical, to ensure the users’ safety. In
this model, there is no prevention or detection mechanism and
no verification process to check user’s data access, when the
critical situation occurs.
Yu et al. [16] proposed the fine-grained data access control
(FDAC) model which is based on attribute-based encryption
(ABE) [9]. The main idea of their approach is to provide fine-
grained access control over sensor data and it is resilient against
attacks such as user colluding and node compromising. How-
ever, their model is based on centralized approach because only
the network controller can perform key management. If the
network controller is compromised, there will be no security
provisioning in the network, which is a single point of failure.
To avoid a single point of failure, Ruj et al. [17] proposed
an access control scheme based on multiauthority ABE. Their
objective is to provide fully distributed data access control by
using several distribution centers (DCs). All the access struc-
tures from each DC, which need to satisfy the attributes from
sensor nodes, are ANDed together to get a complete access for
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the single user. There is no detailed explanation of how to com-
bine all the access structures together. Without the combining
approach, the user has to store all the access structures in order
to access different types of data from the sensor network.
Maw et al. [8], [14] proposed an A2C model with privilege
overriding and behavior monitoring to provide fine-grained ac-
cess control for medical data in WSNs. In this model, no human
effort is needed to override rules and policies because of the in-
troduction of the users’ behavior trust model, and the prevention
and detection mechanism. In this model, the users may be able
to override a denial of access, when unexpected events occur.
In addition, the users’ behavior trust model is used to check the
user’s action, location, time, etc., but there is no detailed in-
formation about the behavior trust model. Without the behavior
trust model, the access decisions cannot be made effectively.
Based on the above discussion, most of the current WSN
access control models are based on traditional role-base access
control (RBAC) model [18] to control data access based on roles
and mostly looking at how to avoid overly tight policy in the
system. Sometimes, the overly tight access control policy might
hold access for the appropriate users in unanticipated events. The
decision is binary: deny or permit access. The RBAC model has
been widely accepted as a policy-based access control model
but roles and policies need to be predefined before the system
can make decisions. Some WSN access control models such as
FDAC, A2C, and Ruj’s model used cryptographic methods for
data storage and data access control but the systems still need
to predefine attributes, roles, and policies before deployment.
It is, however, difficult to determine in advance all the possible
needs for access in real-world applications because there may
be unexpected situations at any time.
There are many potential situations that cannot be defined
in traditional RBAC and cryptography-based systems. For ex-
ample, the roles and policies for emergency and unexpected
situations cannot be defined in advance. When the system faces
these kinds of situations, what will the system do? Does the
system wait until the authorized user comes and logs in? Alter-
natively, in the medical scenario, does a nurse wait for a doctor
who takes care of a patient, in order to retrieve that patient’s
medical record? In most of the emergency and urgent cases,
the users cannot wait until someone comes in order to retrieve
the necessary data. Given this, what is a possible method to
provide a flexible approach in the access control engine? For
real-world applications, the system needs to be flexible enough
to make decisions regarding data access based on unusual situ-
ations in addition to normally defined situations.
Policy languages in support of emergency management have
been already proposed for e-health application for wired and
wireless networks in the literature. For instance, works [13],
[19], [20], [21] use the concept of role-based access control
with BTG policies to manage emergency situations in wireless
networks but it cannot fulfill the requirements of real-world ap-
plications in WSNs because of the constraints such as limited
power, resources, and memory shortage. Current WSN access
control models that we explained in this section do not address
the conflict between data privacy and data availability for emer-
gency events and unanticipated events. Additionally, all of these
models need to define access control policies in advance for both
Fig. 1. Overview of BTG-AC.
expected and unexpected situations. In practice, it is very hard
to define access control policy in advance. Therefore, a new
BTG-AC model that considers the limited resource and storage
by applying BTG concept for unexpected and emergency situa-
tions is proposed to provide a lightweight access control engine
in sensor devices. Additionally, the BTG policy is introduced
to provide a flexible policy to address the conflict between data
availability and data privacy issue and to detect the security
policy violations [2] such as unauthorized information release.
III. BTG-AC MODEL
The BTG-RBAC model proposed by Ferreira et al. [3] is
considered to provide data availability in emergency situations
and is also aimed at E-Health applications in general wire-
less and wired networks. Based on the limitations of WSNs
such as memory size, CPU speed, battery life, network range,
and changing connectivity, the BTG-RBAC model is not suit-
able to use in WSNs because it is implemented in PREMIS [5]
with MySQL [6] database. Therefore, the BTG-RBAC model
was modified and redesigned to function in WSNs; we call this
BTG-AC, but it still has similar functions to those of the BTG-
RBAC model. The main difference is that the BTG-AC model is
developed and implemented within the Ponder2 policy package
and it considers the requirements of WSNs.
Notwithstanding, an overview of BTG-AC can be seen in
Fig. 1. This shows that there are two main modules in the BTG-
AC model: policy enforcement point (PEP) and policy decision
point (PDP). The user requests will go through PEP and all
the user formation will be forwarded to PDP for the decision-
making processes. The details of PEP and PDP are explained
next.
A. Policy Enforcement Point
In BTG-AC, PEP performs as an authentication service
provider between the users and sensor nodes. The authentication
service is needed for the provision of security in the system
especially when the access control model is allowing users to
perform BTG action for data access in emergency situations. A
user has to submit the information to PEP for the authentication
process. When PEP receives the access request from the users,
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it will check the users’ information such as their identity and
cryptographic key. We assumed that the authentication service
is provided through use of a users’ normal login process before
forwarding request to PDP. In future, we will work on the
implementation of the authentication service in PEP by using
ABE [22].
B. Policy Decision Point
In BTG-AC, PDP is a main module. When PDP receives
the decision request from PEP, the access control module will
make an access decision. There are different predefined roles and
policies in the access control module based on the users’ location
and users’ privileges. In the BTG-AC model, there is another
module—prevention and detection module—that keeps a record
of all users’ information for audit purposes. The two modules
cooperate with each other to make the access decision with some
flexibility but still within the required degree of prevention and
detection.
1) Access Control Module: The access control module is
used to enforce the policies for the decision-making process.
In the access control module, there are three different policies,
namely authorization, BTG, and obligation policy. These three
policies are developed and designed under the access control
module.
a) Authorization policy: An authorization policy is used in
BTG-AC to enforce an access decision. It also checks
whether a user should be allowed to access the targeted
object. In authorization policy, the subject, target, and
action are checked to enforce the policy.
b) BTG policy: A BTG policy is used to perform a BTG oper-
ation on a targeted object. To perform the BTG operation,
the new role that describes who is allowed to perform a
certain action at the targeted object is added. The obliga-
tion policy is used along with the BTG operation allowing
an administrator to take actions when the “glass is bro-
ken.” The administrator defines the BTG policy for each
situation where users in an emergency situation require
the BTG action.
c) Obligation policy: An obligation policy is used along with
authorization and BTG policy in some situations. The
obligation policy checks whether one or more conditions
have been evaluated and if they have, they carried out one
or more actions to be performed. The obligation policy is
linked with the prevention and detection module to store
the user information and his access request as an audit log.
In normal access control models, the decision outcomes will
be either permitted or denied access. If user’s criteria satisfy
the access control policies, the access request will be granted.
If they do not match, the access will be denied. In the BTG-AC
model, BTG and the obligation policies are introduced to make
access decisions in normal as well as emergency situations. The
existing decision outcomes in the normal access control models
are extended by introducing BTG and obligation policy in the
access control engine. These decision outcomes are presented
as follows:
1) (Permit, ∅)→A user has permission to access the targeted
object.
2) (Permit, OBLGS) → A user is allowed to access the tar-
geted object but an obligation is carried out when the
access is given.
3) (Deny, ∅) → A user request to access the targeted object
is denied.
4) (Deny, OBLGS) → Along side of a denied access, some
obligations are performed.
5) (Permit, (BTG)*(OBLGS))→A user’s request for access
has been granted by performing BTG action and obliga-
tions such as “Write to Audit,” “Trigger the Alarm,” or “A
Notification Message” are performed along with access
decision.
Based on the above decision outcomes, it is clear that the in-
troduction of BTG and obligation policy is beneficial for medical
data in WSNs by extending the existing decision outcomes.
2) Prevention and Detection Module: The main idea of in-
troducing a prevention and detection mechanism [23]–[25] is to
protect the privacy and confidentiality of data by storing users’
information, actions, etc., as an audit log for the purpose of
detecting security violations. For an audit log to be usable, it
should:
1) be available through a usable interface for the auditors or
the administrators;
2) contain sufficiently detailed information to get a picture
of what has happened.
Regarding the above facts, the audit log is to record the event
and specify 1) when it occurred, 2) the user information associ-
ated with that event, and 3) the results of the decision-making
process. An audit log can assist in detecting security violations
and flaws in the system by detecting any suspicious access from
users. In the audit log format, the subject is a user who tries to
access a medical record from the targeted object with an autho-
rization decision. In the audit log, the contextual information
such as time and department are also recorded. The format of
the audit record is shown as follows:
Auditlog := [Subject + Time + Target + Department
+ Decision Outcomes].
There are two different audit logs in the proposed model.
These are the following.
1) Access Log: Every time a medical record is opened, an
entry is created in the access log containing informa-
tion about the users, the patient, and the document being
accessed.
2) Emergency Log: An entry is created in this log whenever
BTG operation is performed.
These two logs are stored as comma separated value (CSV)
extension, so it can be easily checked and monitored by system
administrators. Therefore, the prevention and detection module
is used in the proposed model to keep a record of all the users
access information as an audit log for detecting security policy
violations.
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE BTG-AC MODEL
Existing architectures for network and systems management
are aimed at large-scale corporate environments, telecommuni-
cation networks, and do not cater for WSNs, although specific
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techniques for policy-based management can be used to some
degree. For WSNs, architectures are needed that scale down to
small devices with local decision making. The limitations of
WSNs such as memory size, CPU speed, battery life, network
range, and changing connectivity require new techniques for op-
timizing resource usage and tailoring information within tight
deadlines. Additionally, flexible techniques will be needed to fil-
ter information and perform access control, as well as defining
and enforcing privacy. Therefore, the proposed BTG-AC model
has been developed in Ponder2 [7] that is a popular lightweight
policy language for BANs and WSNs.
Ponder2 has a high-level configuration and control language
called PonderTalk and user-extensible managed objects that are
programmed in Java. Ponder2 is implemented as self-managed
cell (SMC) [26], which is a set of hardware and software com-
ponents forming an administrative domain. An SMC manages a
set of heterogeneous components (i.e., managed resources) such
as those in body sensor network (BSN), WSN, or even a large-
scale distributed application. Resource adapters are instantiated
to provide a unified view for interaction with the resources as
they may use different interfaces or communication protocols.
An SMC can load other components and services for de-
tecting context changes, monitoring component behaviors, or
for security (authentication and access control). However, the
event bus, the policy service, and the discovery service work in
conjunction with each other and form the core functionality of
an SMC that must always be present. As most pervasive sys-
tem are event driven, the services of a SMC interact using a
common subscribe event bus, although we do not constrain all
communication to be event based. The event bus can be used for
both management and application data such as alarms indicating
that threshold has been exceeded. The discovery service is used
to discover new components which are capable of becoming
members of the SMC, e.g., other SMCs in the vicinity.
The policy service implements a local feedback control loop
to achieve adaption and self-management. It caters different
types of policies, which specify what actions are permitted on
which resources and services. The policy management is a main
element that we modify and add extra function to develop a new
access control model for BSN and WSNs. Therefore, Ponder2
is capable of self-management. The proposed model is imple-
mented in the Ponder2 policy language. In practice, we envisage
that sensor devices or nodes will be too primitive to run their
own management agent, but will be capable of being managed
by an external cell, such as a mobile phone, over a wireless link,
such as bluetooth.
The proposed BTG-AC model is an extended version of Pon-
der2 in which the BTG concept, obligation policy, and preven-
tion and detection mechanism are applied together. The interface
for all the users such as doctors, nurses, and other member of
staff is developed in Java based on managed objects in Ponder2.
The Java class file is loaded dynamically into SMC. The PEP and
PDP are already implemented for the proposed BTG-AC model,
but the policies definition and expression of authorization, BTG,
and obligation policy can vary depend on the requirements of
application. The definition and expression of these three policies
for medical data in Ponder2 are presented as follows.
A. Authorization Policy
The terms of the authorization policy can be changed based
on the requirements of the application. In the BTG-AC model,
the predefined authorization policies will be slightly different
based on the privileges and roles of the users. An example policy
is explained as follows:
Def: Permit-Policy
subject A User
role Doctor or Nurse
action Read
target Normal Medical Record
The above authorization policy defines that a user (a doctor
or a nurse) has a right to perform an action called “read” on
a normal medical record. This means that the subject can only
access the targeted object, when he meets the criteria of the
authorization policy unless the BTG state variable is TRUE to
make a positive decision for access in an emergency situation.
Otherwise, the user request will be denied.
B. BTG Policy
A BTG policy provides flexibility on decision-making pro-
cess regarding access for the emergency or urgent data access.
Thus, the BTG policy allows a user access to confidential data
even if he does not have the access right. We assumed that the
BTG policy is already defined in advance for these kinds of
situations to perform BTG action at the targeted object. If there
is no BTG policy for that object, the user request will not be
granted. The example BTG policy can be seen as follows:
Def: BTG Policy
subject Nurse
action Read
BTG Yes
target Confidential Medical Record
do Call Obligation Policy
The above BTG policy defines that a user (a nurse) can per-
form the BTG action to the targeted object but the obligation
policy will be activated when the access is given to that user.
C. Obligation Policy
An obligation policy is used along with the authorization and
BTG policies to prevent unauthorized access and to detect se-
curity violations. The example of obligation policy is explained
as follows:
Def: Audit-Log
on auditrecord
if BTG action is performed
do write.audit < subject, Time, Target, User Role >
The above obligation policy defines what is a course of action
that will be activated when the “glass is broken” for urgent and
emergency data access. Thereafter, the users’ information such
as subject, targeted object, and user role is stored as CSV in an
audit log for further security purposes.
From the above discussion, it can be seen how the proposed
BTG-AC was developed and how the policies for authorization,
BTG, and obligation can be defined in Ponder2 for medical data
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Fig. 2. Overview of BTG-AC with medical application in BSN.
in WSNs. The audit log is kept as CSV extension in the BTG-AC
model. The BTG-AC model considers to reduce storage space
by an introduction of BTG policy in Ponder2 for WSNs. The
next section will explain how the BTG-AC was evaluated based
on a medical scenario that was also developed under Ponder2
package.
V. EVALUATION OF BTG-AC MODEL
Sensor devices have limited computational capabilities and
strict power consumption requirements. Their operation must,
therefore, be optimized and must constantly adapt in order to
minimize resource consumption. Users are by and large not tech-
nically knowledgeable, and user interaction must be minimized.
Policy-based approaches are particularly suited to WSN’s ap-
plication as they offer simple, flexible, and dynamic technique
for implementing adaptation. Therefore, the proposed BTG-AC
is evaluated by developing a medical scenario in Ponder2.
A. Evaluation Scenario
A medical application is developed to show how the pro-
posed model is fit and how the policy evaluation is done for
decision-making processes. It was developed under the Pon-
der2 package to evaluate the BTG-AC model for BSNs and
WMSNs. We assumed that an SMC [26] that manages a set
of heterogeneous components (i.e., managed resources, policy
management, context awareness, etc.) such as those in a BSN
network is represented as a wearable sensor node. In practice,
the high-end sensor nodes are considered to use. In the exam-
ple scenario, each patient had his own BSN, which consisted
of several sensors. The sensor nodes sense and collect infor-
mation such as glucose level, temperature, heart rate, etc. We
assumed that collected data were stored as the medical record
in BSNs. Users such as doctors and nurses were trying to access
the medical record of the patients via mobile, personal digital
assistant (PDA), or personal computer. For example, interac-
tions with BSN nodes occur via IEEE 802.15.4 wireless links,
while interactions with PDAs or mobile phones. Each SMC had
managed its own policy. These policies were specified and could
be performed by each SMC.
Fig. 2 expresses the overview diagram of how to apply the
BTG-AC model in healthcare applications for BSNs and WM-
SNs. Based on Fig. 2, the step-by-step process of user access to
the targeted object is explained as follows.
1) A user sends an access request to the targeted object in
the system.
2) PEP authenticates the user. Simultaneously, it sends a de-
cision request to PDP for decisions regarding data access.
3) PDP calls the access control engine and passes through
the details (such as the requested operation, the targeted
object, and the contextual information) to make decisions
regarding data access.
4) The access control engine returns permitted access or per-
mitted access with obligation or permitted access with
BTGs and obligation (or denied access or denied access
with overriding and obligation, in which case a denied
message is sent from PDP to the user and the request
terminates here).
5) PDP forwards the decision response to the targeted object.
6) The targeted object returns the results.
7) PDP returns the results to the user.
The following policies in Table I are identified and developed
to evaluate the proposed model. In a medical scenario, there are
two different types of data for each patient: confidential medi-
cal records (ob1) and normal medical records (ob2). The access
policies for users’ access to these medical records will be dif-
ferent based on the access privileges and roles of the users. In
addition, different security levels are required in these medical
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TABLE I
EXAMPLE OF BTG-RBAC POLICY
Policy Role Operation Object BTG State Obligations
1 Doctor read ob2 N.A. N.A.
2 Doctor read ob1 N.A. oblg [Write to Audit]
3 Nurse read ob2 N.A. oblg [Write to Audit]
4 Nurse O BTG( read) ob1 TRUE oblg [Notify Manager; Write to Audit; Reset BTG to FALSE]
5 Admin resetBTG ob1 N.A. N.A.
6 Admin read log N.A. N.A.
records. Tight policies might be used for confidential medical
records to provide data privacy. Nevertheless, the access to even
confidential data can be essential in some circumstances. For
example, the doctor should be able to access the confidential
medical record of a patient when the nurse cannot but the deci-
sion can be changed to a positive decision if the nurse performs
the BTG actions.
In Table I, policy 1 states that the doctor is allowed to read the
normal medical record, i.e., object 2 (ob2). In policy 2, the doctor
is allowed to access the confidential medical record (ob1) but an
obligation such as “Write to Audit” is activated. Policy 3 allows
a nurse to read the normal medical record ob2 , but it will trigger
one obligation “Write to Audit”. In policy 4, the nurse is not
permitted to access the confidential medical record (ob1) unless
he or she performs the BTG action in that object for emergency
data access, but the BTG variable needs to be TRUE meaning
that BTG is enabled. Therefore, an extra BTG role is needed
for the nurse. Additionally, some obligations such as “Write to
Audit”, “notify to manager”, and “rest BTG variable to FALSE
after 30 mins”. This implies BTG = TRUE. Policy 5 is quite
simple. It allows resetting the BTG variable from FALSE to
TRUE or TRUE to FALSE. For policy 6, the administrator can
easily check the audit log to monitor any legitimate use from
authorized users and to prevent any misuse from unauthorized
users.
Policy 4 demonstrates that if policy 3 is allowed, the system
will perform three obligations such as “write to audit,” “notify to
manager,” and “reset BTG variable to FALSE after 30 min.” This
implies BTG = TRUE, FALSE. Policy 5 is quite simple. It is
allowed to reset the BTG variable to FALSE to TRUE or TRUE
to FALSE. For policy 6, r5 allows a user to read ob1 , but it will
trigger one obligation that is “write to audit.” The administrator
or manager can easily check the audit log to detect any use
from authorized users and to prevent any use from unauthorized
users.
B. Threat Model
The attacker-centric-based threat model [27] is respected and
commonly used. Defence strategy is of course improved if there
is a reasonable understanding of how attackers think. By think-
ing like attackers and being aware of their likely tactics, the
system can be more effective when applying countermeasures.
Several threats that can be faced in the applications can be cat-
2A countermeasure is an action or technique that can reduce a threat and an
attack by eliminating or preventing it.
egorized based on the goals of the attacks. Knowledge of these
threats can help to organize a security strategy and might be able
to help plan responses to these threats. In this section, the threat
model is categorized based on STRIDE [28]. We analyzed the
STRIDE model in the medical scenario as follows.
1) Spoofing: Spoofing is attempting to gain access to a sys-
tem by using a false identity. This can be accomplished
using stolen user credentials or false information. After
the attacker successfully gains access as a legitimate user,
elevation of privileges can begin. Example: A nurse pre-
tends to be a doctor.
2) Tampering: Tampering is the unauthorized modification of
data, but we did not address it explicitly in this dissertation.
Same considerations apply to write as to read.
Example: A nurse or doctor edits the medical record of a
patient illegitimately.
3) Repudiation: Repudiation is the ability of users to deny
that they performed specific actions. Without adequate
auditing, repudiation attacks are difficult to prove. The
issue of repudiation is concerned with a user denying that
he performed an action. The defence mechanism is needed
in place to ensure that all user activity can be tracked and
recorded. Lack of auditing and logging of changes made
to data threatens the ability to identify when changes were
made and who made those changes.
Example: A nurse denies that he has edited the medical
record.
4) Information disclosure: Information disclosure is the un-
wanted exposure of private data. Sensitive data need to be
stored securely to prevent a malicious user from gaining
access to and reading the data. The disclosure of confi-
dential data can occur when sensitive data can be viewed
by unauthorized users. Only authenticated and authorized
users should be able to access the data that is specific to
them. Access to data should be restricted to users.
Example: Other staff members from the hospital try to
read the medical record.
5) Denial of service: Denial of service is the process of mak-
ing system resources unavailable.
Example: A common application layer DoS attack will
send multiple simultaneous requests for data access. These
requests will most likely put the access control module
under DoS condition and the user will likely be unable to
access the medical record.
6) Elevation of privileges: Elevation of privilege occurs when
a user with limited privileges uses the identity of a privi-
leged user to gain access to a data resource.
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TABLE II
POSSIBLE THREATS AND COUNTERMEASURES
Threat Countermeasure
Spoofing Strong Authentication (ABE)
Tampering Strong Authorization (ABE and Access Control)
Repudiation Audit Trials (Audit Record or Log)
Information Disclosure ABE and Access Control
Denial of Service Access Control
Elevation of Privilege Access Control
Fig. 3. User interface for a nurse.
Example: A nurse tries to access restricted data by using
the fault identity.
Based on the above discussion, these threats and attacks are
trying to violate the security services such as confidentiality, in-
tegrity, authenticity, repudiation, etc. These threats and attacks
should be protected by using security mechanisms or counter-
measures. A countermeasure is a safeguard that addresses a
threat and mitigates risk. Table II lists the security threats that
can violate the security services and the possible countermea-
sures to defend against them in the proposed BTG-AC model.
C. Evaluation Framework Based on Example Scenario
We evaluate the BTG-AC model based on the above example
scenario and policy definition that was developed under Ponder2
package. In this section, user interface, BTG interface, audit
log interface, and how the access decision was made based on
different access policies are presented with screen shots.
1) User Interface: To evaluate the BTG-AC model for medi-
cal data in WSNs, we developed the users’ interfaces under Pon-
der2 package. Different access policies are applied to a nurse.
Fig. 3 shows the interface of a nurse (Htoo). The nurse can
access the normal medical record of Alice but one obligation
action is triggered and activated when the access is given. The
nurse does not have access right regarding access to the confi-
dential medical data unless the BTG policy is used to make an
Fig. 4. Interfaces for BTG.
Fig. 5. Interface for audit log.
authorization decision in urgent and emergency circumstances.
At the same time, obligations are triggered and activated. The
management teams can check the audit log to prevent and detect
security violations.
2) BTG: When a nurse wants to perform a BTG action to
access patients’ confidential data, a BTG interface will appear.
The user’s attempt to gain access will be notified to the user and
his/her management team and necessary actions will be taken.
The confirmation message will appear twice before the access is
given to the nurse. Additionally, another simple authentication
process is used to protect the privacy of patients’ information
by using normal log in process before the second confirmation
box appears. The interfaces for BTG action are shown in Fig. 4.
3) Audit Log: We developed the audit framework based on
managed objects in Ponder2 package. The interface of an au-
dit log can be seen in Fig. 5. This figure shows what kind of
information and data are stored in the audit log. The first audit
log shows that the nurse accessed the normal medical record of
Alice. For the second log, the same nurse requested access to
the confidential medical record by performing the BTG action
and his or her access be granted. A doctor, who accessed a confi-
dential medical record, was granted access as can be seen in the
audit log of that patient. All the access requests to the medical
records are recorded in which every day is determined by the
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TABLE III
CONCEPTS AND APPROACHES FOR A2 C AND BTG-AC
A2 C BTG-AC
- Discretionary Overriding of Access Control - Role-Based Access Control
- User Behavior Trust Model - Break-The-Glass concept
- Prevention and Detection Mechanism - Prevention and Detection Mechanism
user’ role. Based on the audit log, the management teams can
check which users performed the BTG action and who among
these will be granted access to the confidential medical records.
D. Summary
Based on the evaluation results with a medical scenario, the
BTG-AC model can be applied for medical data in WSNs after
the framework and several changes within the access control
engine are made. The BTG-AC model provides flexibility of
decision-making processes regarding access to medical records.
The three policies such as authorization, BTG and obligation
cooperate with each other to make decisions about data access
in the emergency situations.
VI. COMPARISON BETWEEN BTG-AC AND A2C MODEL
To make a full comparison with the proposed BTG-AC model,
an A2C model is chose among current WSN access control
model because it has similar properties as BTG-AC. As well,
both models are developed in Ponder2 policy language. This
section recapitulates both A2C and BTG-AC models to make a
comparison based on the evaluation criteria. First, the evaluation
criteria are discussed for both A2C and BTG-AC models. Addi-
tionally, a brief discussion of the A2C model is explained. This
is followed by an exploration of advantages and disadvantages
of BTG-AC over current access control models in WSNs.
A. Evaluation Based on Features
In this section, the comparison of the A2C and BTG-AC
models is made based on the evaluation criteria including the
network architecture model, the concepts and approaches, the
decision outcomes, the access control policy and role, the data
confidentiality and data privacy, and the data availability.
1) Network Architecture Model: Access control models can
be different based on their network architecture model when the
cryptographic keys, roles, policies, and attributes are distributed
to users from the trusted authority or controller. The A2C model
is based on a distributed approach to make and adjust access
decisions dynamically. This means that each sensor is deployed
with the access control engine to make an effective local de-
cision within itself based on the users’ request and the sensor
is required to store access policies. Unlike A2C, the BTG-AC
model is based on a centralized approach because each sensor
node cannot store all the possible situations and BTG operations
in the system. The disadvantage is that there might be a single
point of failure in the BTG-AC model.
2) Concepts and Approaches: The A2C and BTG-AC mod-
els use different concepts and approaches to fill the research
gaps and the requirements of the application in WSNs. One
Fig. 6. Overview of A2 C.
similarity between these two WSN access control models is that
both aim to provide data availability in emergency and unantic-
ipated situations. An outline of the concepts and approaches for
these two models can be seen in Table III.
The A2C model was proposed by Maw et al. [14] to provide a
flexible access decision in WSNs. This is incorporated the con-
cept of possibility-with-override [29], [30] into WSN for hard-
to-define and unanticipated situations. Possibility-with-override
means users might be able to override a denial of access, when
unexpected events occur. The A2C model also uses user behavior
monitoring and trust model to check users’ actions, location,
time, etc. Whenever users try to access data at the sensor nodes,
all user behavior and users’ information will be kept by pre-
vention and detection mechanism as an audit record to detect
and prevent abnormal and unauthorized access. The overview
diagram of the A2C model can be seen in Fig. 6.
The main difference between A2C and BTG-AC models is
that the user behavior trust module is introduced in PDP. There-
fore, there are three modules inside PDP unlike BTG-AC (see
Fig. 1). These modules are the access control module, preven-
tion and detection module, and user behavior trust module. After
PEP forwards the decision request to PDP, the information such
as user, action, environment, and context information will be
forwarded to the access control module and the user behavior
trust module. The user behavior trust module will calculate the
trust value. To determine the user behavior trust value, the previ-
ous and current value of user behavior trust will be used. Current
trust value will be calculated and evaluated based on the user
information that is forwarded by the PEP. The previous trust
value is stored in the trust module.
There is limited local decision-making capability in current
WSN access control models because it is impossible to define
the possibility of denied and permitted access for all situations,
especially in WMSNs and WSNs. The A2C model is based
on the concept of discretionary overriding of access control by
Rissanen et al. [29]. The system defines permitted and denied
access policies for normal situations and leaves the possibility-
with-override for emergency and unusual situations as the de-
fault to address the data availability issue. In the A2C model,
the behavior trust model is introduced to monitor the behavior
information as well as to compare with previous and predefined
users’ behavior pattern. A prevention and detection mechanism
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is used in both models to prevent the unauthorized information
release and to detect security violations that can occur in the
system anytime. The concepts of the A2C model can provide
both data availability and data privacy, but there is a lack of
information for the behavior trust model.
Unlike A2C, the BTG-AC model uses core RBAC with obli-
gation and BTG concept to make decisions regarding access
for emergency and unanticipated situations with details in-
formation for each components. The BTG-AC model needs
predefined access roles and policies in advance for any situation.
The authorization decision-making process is made within the
core RBAC engine based on the inputs of the current section,
the requested operation, and the target object. The main idea of
the BTG concept is to allow the users emergency and urgent
access to the system when a normal authentication process does
not perform or work perfectly. In BTG-AC, BTG action is based
on predefined user accounts. The system is managed in a man-
ner that can make data access available in emergency situations
with minimum of human interactions.
The BTG approach can be easily applied in the existing ar-
chitectures and systems. It is very useful for existing systems
because it does not involve additional automated technology. It
is intended to cover unanticipated and emergency situations and
it should not be used as a replacement for a helpdesk. BTG-
AC can make decisions regarding data access quickly without
unreasonable administrative involvements and delays. When an
emergency or BTG account is activated in the system, it can alert
the security administrator for that event for auditing purposes.
This means that the monitoring process is required as an extra
checkpoint to detect security violations. The proposed approach
is well suited for the emergency decision-making process, but
after an emergency in which a BTG account has been used, that
account has to be deleted or disabled to prevent a replay attack.
Therefore, human interactions are still involved in the system.
The advantage of the BTG-AC model is that it can provide data
availability service in emergency situations with a certain level
of prevention and detection.
3) Access Control Policy: In this section, the access control
policies defined in both A2C and BTG-AC are presented. Similar
access control policies are used from both models to make an
effective comparison.
Table IV shows how the access control policies are defined in
the A2C model for the same medical scenario in Section V. In
policy 1, a doctor is allowed to read the normal medical record
(ob2) without obligation. In policy 2, the doctor is allowed to
read the confidential medical record (ob1) of a patient but an
obligation such as “Write to Audit” will be taken as an action
when the decision has been made. Therefore, the management
teams can check the audit log to detect security breaches that
can occur by the authorized users. This means that the stored
data at the ob2 is not as sensitive as ob1 . The roles and policies
for other users such as nurses and other members of staff will
be predefined differently. Policy 1 and policy 2 are the same in
Table I for BTG-AC.
In policy 3, the nurse is not allowed to access the confidential
data (ob1) unless the associated user overrides the access policy
for emergency data access, but some obligations will be acti-
vated. Based on policy 3, the users (U* represents the group of
nurses) can override access policy. If he or she overrides based
on policy 3, his or her behavior trust value will be lower than
normal data access. Access will only granted to that user when
his behavior trust value is great than three. Otherwise, his or her
access to the confidential data will be denied. Policy 4 allows
the nurse to access the normal medical data (ob2); however, one
obligation action is triggered. Policies 5 and 3 have a similar
property. There is a chance for member of staff from hospital to
access the normal medical record (ob2), but they have to override
access policy. The administrator or manager can easily check
the audit log to detect illegitimate use from authorized users and
to prevent legitimate use from unauthorized users.
The complete BTG-AC policy can be seen in Table I and
discussion in Section V. The policy definitions for both A2C and
BTG-AC have a similar structure. The weakness of the BTG-AC
model is that an additional role for a BTG policy is needed for
each user to perform BTG operation and an additional account
is needed for emergency access. As a constraint, the BTG role
needs to be considered in advance and predefined before the
system is running in real time.
4) Decision Outcomes: In both A2C and BTG-AC models,
the existing decision outcomes in current access control models
such as permitted access and denied access are extended into
five different outcomes. The decision outcomes for the BTG-
AC model are already discussed in the previous section. For
the A2C model, the decision outcomes are extended because
of the discretionary overriding process with the user behavior
trust value and the prevention, and detection mechanism. These
decision outcomes are explained as follows:
1) Permitted access: A user access request has been permit-
ted.
2) Denied access: A user access request has been denied.
The user is not allowed to access the resources.
3) Permitted access with obligation: A user access request
has been permitted but an obligation is executed when
data access is given to that user especially for important
and confidential information.
4) Permitted access with overriding and obligation: A user
does not have privilege to access the resources but his
or her request will be granted if he or she overrides pol-
icy within some constraints. The obligation policies are
activated when access is granted to the user.
5) Denied access with overriding and obligation: A user
access will be denied, if he or she tries to override the
policy and does not satisfy some thresholds from that
policy. At the same time, the obligations such as write to
audit, etc., will be performed.
Based on the above decision outcomes, it is clear that the
introduction of different concepts and approached can provide a
flexible approach in the access control engine by extending the
decision outcomes. Both A2C and BTG-AC models add a finer
grained level of control in access control engine for emergency
situations.
5) Data Availability and Data Privacy: Both the A2C and
BTG-AC models are designed for making access decisions dy-
namically and efficiently in emergency and unanticipated situ-
ations. In the A2C model, the decisions regarding access can
be evaluated and adjusted dynamically, based on policies such
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TABLE IV
EXAMPLE OF DEFINED POLICY FOR THE A2 C MODEL
Policy Subject Role Operation Object Override Obligations
1 U1 Doctor read ob2 - -
2 U1 Doctor read ob1 - oblg [Write to Audit]
3 U∗ Nurse Override( r e a d ) (if T > 3) ob1 Override oblg [Notify Manager; Write to Audit; Trigger the alarm]
4 U2 Nurse read ob2 - oblg [Write to Audit]
5 U∗ Staff Override( r e a d ) (if T > 3) ob2 Override oblg [Notify Manager; Write to Audit; Trigger the alarm]
TABLE V
COMPARISON OF THE BTG-AC MODEL WITH RELATED MODELS
Access Control
Model
Network
Architecture
Decision
Outcomes
Data Availability Prevention and
Detection
Mechanism
BTG-AC Centralized 5 Yes Yes
A2 C [8] Distributed 5 Yes Yes
FDAC [16] Centralized 2 No No
CA-RBAC [15] Centralized 2 Yes No
DFG-AC [17] Distributed 2 No No
as authorization, obligation and overriding. Especially, in emer-
gency situations, the user behavior trust value and the overriding
policy are used to adjust access decisions to provide data avail-
ability in emergency and unanticipated situations. BTG-AC has
similar properties to the A2C model, but human interaction is
still needed to define for BTG operation; the BTG role also
needs to be predefined in advance for emergency situations.
Users need extra roles for breaking the glass for unexpected
situations and need an additional emergency account to do so
for unexpected and unanticipated situations. Another advantage
of the BTG-AC model over the A2C model is that a simple user
log in process is used as an additional security provisioning to
protect the privacy of the patient information.
6) Summary: A comparison of the BTG-AC model with re-
lated works are expressed in Table V based on the evaluation
criteria but only current WSN access control models are com-
pared. The centralized access control management is used in
BTG-AC, FDAC, and CA-RBAC, but for A2C and DFG-AC,
the distributed access control management is used. The existing
decision outcomes such as permitted access and denied access
are extended in both BTG-AC and A2C and these are only two
models that address data availability issue and detect security
policy violation by using the prevention and detection mecha-
nism. Based on the above discussion, Ponder2 policy language
is a popular policy language for resource limited devices such as
sensor nodes. Therefore, we assumed that the BTG-AC model
is developed in Ponder2 based on limitations and requirements
of WSNs. Additionally, the BTG-AC model addressed to solve
the conflict between data availability and data privacy by using
BTG approach and ABE-based authentication process.
B. Advantages and Disadvantages over Current WSN Access
Control Models
The highlights for the advantages and disadvantages of BTG-
AC over current WSN access control models are explained here.
The BTG-AC model can manage policy such as creating a new
role and editing an existing role and it can be used easily in
existing systems and architectures. This model can provide data
availability in normally defined situations as well as emergency
situations; however, in the BTG-AC model, the BTG state and
account need to be opened and defined in advance for emergency
access. The BTG-AC model can provide data availability with
certain constraints and limitations. Additionally, the BTG-AC
model can detect security violations in the systems by checking
the audit record in the prevention and detection mechanism. The
main contribution of the BTG-AC model is that data availability
and data privacy can be provided in both defined situations, and
some emergency situations for effective treatment of patients in
the real-time environment.
Alongside with the advantages, there are some drawbacks in
the proposed BTG-AC model. Data availability is provided in
BTG-AC, but some limitations apply for data access in emer-
gency situations. A system administrator needs to open an emer-
gency account for users in advance for BTG operation and
emergency access. In addition, the BTG or emergency account
can be used one time only to prevent replay attacks. The user
needs to reopen the emergency account for another attempt. If
this is not done, the system administrator needs to open and
activate the emergency account for all users. This means that
some kinds of administration processes are needed in BTG-AC
for emergency situations. The storage might be costly because
an additional role is needed for each user to use a BTG account.
An alternative way is to use data aggregator as centralized ac-
cess management to reduce the storage space in actual sensor
nodes.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The overall contributions of this paper is the design and de-
velopment of a lightweight BTG-AC model that considers to
reduce storage space for medical data in WSNs to address the
data availability issue and to detect the security policy violations
from both authorized and unauthorized users. The concepts of
BTG, prevention and detection mechanism, and obligation pro-
vide more flexible access than other current WSN access control
models. The BTG-AC model has been developed under Ponder2
package. All the modules—access control module and preven-
tion and detection module—have been found to cooperate to
make access decisions and record a users’ accountability to de-
tect security violations from authorized users. Additionally, the
A2C framework, which has similar properties as BTG-AC, is
briefly discussed to make a meaningful comparison with BTG-
AC. One possible weakness of BTG-AC is that the human de-
cision is needed to predefine BTG policy for each object. We
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are considering to redesign the BTG-AC model to overcome
that weakness in future work. We plan to develop the BTG-AC
model within the actual sensor nodes for medical applications
in WSNs. In addition, we will work on the implementation of
the authentication service by using ABE.
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